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A SLICK SITUATION: THE FIRST CIRCUIT CREATES A BUZZ
AND TURNS TO NEPA TO STRENGTHEN FEDERAL OIL
SPILL REGULATION IN UNITED STATES V
COALITION FOR BUZZARDS BAY
I. INTRODUCTION
"America's economic health and prosperity are inexorably
linked to the productive and sustainable use of our envi-
ronment. That is why NEPA remains a vital tool for my
Administration as we work to protect our Nation's envi-
ronment . ... "
President Barack Obama recently called attention to the con-
tinuing significance of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), which was signed into law over forty years ago and instilled
an elevated commitment to environmental awareness in the United
States government.2 NEPA employs a basic policy to ensure the
government gives suitable consideration to the environment and in-
vokes public participation before undertaking any major federal ac-
tion.3 Since its inception in 1969, NEPA has notably improved
certain areas of federal environmental policy and remains a valua-
ble tool in addressing present-day environmental issues.4
The danger of oil spills is one such environmental issue, as they
pose a constant threat to the marine resources and coastal waters of
1. Presidential Proclamation, President Barack Obama, 40th Anniversary of
the National Environmental Policy Act, The White House Office of the Secretary
(Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-proclama-
tion-40th-anniversary-national-environmental-policy-act (recognizing continuing
influence of National Environmental Policy Act and recommitting United States to
carry out its policies to enhance Nation's environmental quality).
2. Id. (reaffirming national commitment to NEPA's purpose of protecting
public health, safety, and environmental quality); National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335 (2006) (providing standards to implement
federal government's heightened commitment to environmental protection).
3. See generally National Environmental Policy Act § 4331 (mandating coopera-
tion of federal government, states, agencies, and public to implement federal poli-
cies with desirable levels of environmental quality and preservation).
4. See ROBERT G. DREHER, GEORGETOWN ENVIRONMENTAL LAw & POLICY INSTI-
TUTE, NEPA UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICAL ASSAULT ON THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICY ACr 4 (2005), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/
researcharchive/nepa/NEPAUnderSiegeFinal.pdf (asserting NEPA has proven to
be "extraordinarily successful in accomplishing its goals"). For a more detailed
discussion of NEPA, see infra notes 105-131 and accompanying text.
(173)
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the United States.5 Due to the dominance of oil as an energy
source in the United States, the nation's waterways have been and
will continue to be utilized to constantly move and transport oil
around the country.6 The widespread and consistent transporta-
tion of oil, however, creates an inevitable risk of oil spills. 7 Accord-
ingly, an estimated 1.3 million gallons of oil spill into United States'
waters each year.8 While persistent efforts to enact more stringent
regulations led to an overall decline in oil spills, the risk of spills
remains. Federal and state governments, therefore, continue to
adopt preparedness and prevention measures to decrease the po-
tential environmental harms resulting from oil spills.' 0
5. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 94 (2000) (emphasizing dan-
ger presented by maritime transport of oil); see alsoJONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, OIL SPILLS IN U.S. COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND,
AND GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2010), available at http://as-
sets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33705_20100430.pdf (observing several major oil spills
in United States' coastal waters have yielded lasting environmental effects); K. Al-
len Brooks, California Oil Spills in the Wake of United States v. Locke, 12 U.S.F. MAR.
L.J. 227, 231-33 (1999-2000) (discussing history of prominent United States' oil
spills); Steven R. Swanson, Federalism, The Admiralty, and Oil Spills, 27 J. MAR. L. &
Com. 379, 379 (1996) (noting relative frequency of ocean-based oil spills in United
States). "The maritime oil transport industry presents ever-present, all too real
dangers of oil spills from tanker ships, spills which could be catastrophes for the
marine environment." Locke, 529 U.S. at 94.
6. See, e.g., Ramseur, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing widespread use of oil in
United States); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ET AL., OIL IN THE SEA III: INPUTS,
FATES, AND EFFECTS 1 (2003) [hereinafter OIL IN THE SEA] (discussing "pervasive"
role oil plays in modern society). Because oil continues to be a dominant source of
energy in the United States, " [vl ast quantities of oil continuously enter the country
via vessel or pipeline and are then transported to destinations throughout the
country." Ramseur, supra note 5, at 1.
7. See Ramseur, supra note 5, at 1 (observing oil spills are inevitable due to
widespread use and transport of oil).
8. See Oil Spills, WWW.FUELECONOMY.Gov, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/
oilspills.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) (approximating average annual amount of
oil spilled in United States waterways).
9. See Ramseur, supra note 5, at 28 (discussing existing concern for lack of oil
spill response action despite overall decrease in number and volume of oil spills in
recent years); see also Response to Oil Spills, U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY Jan. 27,
2011), http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/learning/response.htm (not-
ing almost 14,000 oil spills in United States coastal waters reported each year de-
spite prevention efforts). Experts predict oil will remain a primary source of
energy in the United States, and the United States will continue importing a sub-
stantial amount of oil by means of coastal waterways. Ramseur, supra note 5, at 24.
Because a majority of U.S. oil imports arrive by vessel via the Gulf Coast and east
coast, the possibility of oil spills will continue in the coming years. Id. at 27.
10. Ramseur, supra note 5, at 10 (noting oil spill governance in United States
is combination of federal, state, and international authorities). This overlapping
framework gives several federal agencies the authority to implement oil spill regu-
lations. Id.
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The impact of oil spills can be devastating." Even a minor spill
can disrupt marine ecosystems, cause significant harm to individual
organisms, and affect entire marine species and habitats.' 2 Oil
spills also implicate steep economic recovery costs, impress perma-
nent damage upon natural resources, and hinder local infrastruc-
ture and services.13 Various sources have been held responsible for
the damaging effects of oil spills, including vessels, facilities, and
pipelines.' 4 Governments recognized the significance of oil trans-
portation, and imposed stricter requirements upon oil-transporting
vessel operations in an attempt to reduce the impact of possible
future spills.' 5
Historically, large-scale oil spill disasters prompted both fed-
eral and state governments to take regulatory action against oil-
transporting vessels to decrease the risk of future spills.' 6 Congress
passed one of the most prominent regulatory maritime laws, the Oil
11. See OIL IN THE SEA, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining widespread transport of
oil translates to high risk of spills causing massive and widespread environmental
damage). Even minor spills can cause significant toxic damage. Id.
12. See id. at 120 (noting harmful effects of oil on marine environments have
been "unambiguously established"); see also Ramseur, supra note 5, at 6-7 (discuss-
ing both short- and long-term damage to specific marine species caused by oil
spills). Short-term impacts present immediate danger to marine organisms and
habitats, and long-term impacts can significantly affect the survival and reproduc-
tive success of marine species. Id.
13. Ramseur, supra note 5, at 8-10 (summarizing consequences of spills to
include considerable cleanup and recovery costs, damage and rehabilitation of nat-
ural resources, and disruption of business activity and local reputation near spill).
14. See id. at 3-6 (explaining potential sources of oil spill incidents). While
the sources of oil spills affecting U.S. waters are extensive, this Note focuses solely
on oil spills caused by oil-transporting vessels and the preventative measures taken
by the states and United States Coast Guard to regulate such vessels. Id.
15. See id. at 19 (discussing federally-mandated responsibilities of oil-trans-
porting vessels to prevent future oil spills); see also Massachusetts Oil Spill Prevention
and Response Efforts, MASSACHUsETrs DEP'T OF ENvrT. PROTECTION, http://
www.mass.gov/dep/cleanup/ospre.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) [hereinafter
Mass. Spill Efforts] (asserting increased state efforts to regulate oil spill prevention
in response to 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil disaster in Gulf of Mexico). This Note
does not discuss the Deepwater Horizon oil spill because the Deepwater Horizon
disaster involved offshore drilling rigs and this Note focuses solely on oil-transport-
ing vessel regulation. See Mass. Spill Efforts, supra. It is important to note, however,
the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf significantly magnified both federal and
state efforts to properly address oil spill regulation in the United States. Id. The
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection stated, "Despite the re-
mote possibility of oil from the Gulf reaching our coast [Massachusetts] is continu-
ing efforts begun in the aftermath of the 2003 Buzzards Bay oil spill to strengthen
[its] ability to prevent and respond to oil spills in the coastal waters of the Com-
monwealth." Id.
16. See Swanson, supra note 5, at 379 (noting major oil spills can implicate
both federal and state laws).
2012] 175
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Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),17 in response to the Exxon Valdez
disaster off the coast of Alaska.18 Even prior to the OPA, clear dif-
ferences existed between federal and state approaches to the pre-
vention of oil spills, resulting in widespread litigation concerning
whether federal maritime law could preempt state regulations.' 9
Despite the limitations imposed on state authorities by federal law,
there remains a fine line between federal and state governance of
oil-transporting vessel regulation that continues to be tested.20
Congress expanded its authority to regulate tank vessels and
protect marine resources by enacting the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA).21 The PWSA allocated federal regula-
17. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006) (noting com-
plete provisions of OPA).
18. See, e.g., Ramseur, supra note 5, at 12-16 (discussing OPA's purpose to cre-
ate unified oil pollution law in response to widespread dispute and confusion sur-
rounding current federal and state oil spill regulations); Swanson, supra note 5, at
379-80 (observing Exxon Valdez oil spill to be worst in U.S. history at time and
creation of OPA in response to subsequent problems produced by spill); William
Yardley, Recovery Still Incomplete After Valdez Spill, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/us/06alaska.html?ref=exxonvaldezoil
spill1989 (discussing Exxon Valdez disaster that spilled 11 million gallons of oil
into Alaskan waters, stained 1,500 miles of coastline, killed hundreds of thousands
of marine animals, and devastated local communities when it hit undersea reef).
For a further discussion of OPA, see infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. The
Exxon Valdez spill highlighted the inadequacy of existing maritime law, and Con-
gress enacted the OPA to consolidate existing federal oil spill laws under one pro-
gram. Ramseur, supra note 5, at 12.
19. See, e.g., Ramseur, supra note 5, at 11 (noting central issue surrounding oil
spill regulation is state preemption and "whether a federal oil spill law should limit
a state's ability to impose stricter requirements"); Swanson, supra note 5, at 379-80
(noting differing legal systems governing oil spill regulation caused tension be-
tween federal government and states); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89,
94 (2000) (clarifying federal and state governments' roles in oil spill prevention
and reaffirming weight given to prior federal judicial decisions); Ray v. At. Rich-
field Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978) (differentiating between federal and state
authority regarding oil spill regulation and noting predominance of federal law in
this area of law).
20. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 117 (emphasizing political responsibility of federal
government in this area); see also Ray, 435 U.S. at 158 (noting federal laws will void
state laws to the extent the two conflict, even if Congress did not expressly or im-
plicitly foreclose state legislation in particular area); Ramseur, supra note 5, at 24-
25 (noting confusion between federal and state oil spill regulations remains de-
spite attempts to clarify). "[I]t is, in large measure, for Congress and the Coast
Guard to confront whether their regulatory scheme, which demands a high degree
of uniformity, is adequate. States . . . will participate in the process." Locke, 529
U.S. at 117.
21. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq., 46 U.S.C.
§ 3701 et seq. (2006) (noting complete set of PWSA provisions); Ports and Water-
ways Safety Act § 1221 (a)-(d) (stating policy for protection of marine environment
through regulation of vessel traffic and navigation); Ports and Waterways Safety
Act § 3703 (requiring Coast Guard to issue rules regulating vessels for increased
protection of United States' waters); see also Brooks, supra note 5, at 231 (asserting
4
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tory power to the United States Coast Guard and authorized the
Coast Guard to issue regulations providing the maximum protec-
tion of vessel navigation and the marine environment.22 Also in the
early 1970s emerged a nationally recognized movement to restore,
maintain, and preserve the environment, at which time the federal
government began to take unprecedented action to address these
issues. 23 The enactment of NEPA demonstrated this commit-
ment.2 4 NEPA is predominantly a procedural law, and it requires
federal agencies to give adequate consideration to the environment
before undertaking any major agency action.25 The Coast Guard is
the federal agency commanded with protecting the nation's water-
ways, and accordingly must abide by NEPA when promulgating
rules and regulations.26
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re-
cently addressed the enduring conflict between federal and state oil
spill regulations.27 In doing so, the court reiterated the significance
creation of PWSA was in response to major oil spill from American tanker off En-
glish coast in 1967). For a further discussion of the PWSA, see infta notes 84-87
and accompanying text. The Coast Guard rules must address the "design, con-
struction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualifi-
cation, and manning of vessels." Ports and Waterways Safety Act § 3703(a).
22. See Ports and Waterways Safety Act § 1223 (establishing vessel operating
requirements); § 3703(a) (indicating issuance of vessel operating requirements
pursuant to federal authority); see also Locke, 529 U.S. at 101 (describing Coast
Guard responsibility under PWSA).
23. See Brooks, supra note 5, at 231 (discussing era of advancement in environ-
mental law in United States).
24. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)
(explaining purpose of NEPA). For a further discussion of NEPA, see infra notes
105-131 and accompanying text.
25. See generally National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 4332 (mandating
all federal agencies comply with NEPA procedures to achieve desirable levels of
environmental awareness and preservation); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (discussing general policy objectives of
NEPA); Alvin L. Alm, NEPA: Past, Present, and Future, EPAJouRNAL (1988), available
at http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/topics/nepa/01.html (summarizing
overarching goal of NEPA to protect environment).
26. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 553 (1978) (observing NEPA obligation of all federal agencies "to con-
sider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action"
and to promptly inform public of any such impacts); see also U.S. Coast Guard His-
tory, U.S. COAST GuARD (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.uscg.mil/history/ (noting
Coast Guard operates as part of Department of Homeland Security and serves as
"the nation's front-line agency for enforcing the nation's laws at sea, protecting the
marine environment and the nation's vast coastline and ports").
27. See United States v. Coal. for Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d 26, 28-29 (1st Cir.
2011) (addressing conflict between federal and state oil spill regulation in Buz-
zards Bay, Massachusetts).
2012] 177
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of agency compliance with NEPA.28 In United States v. Coalition for
Buzzards Bay (Buzzards Bay),29 the First Circuit concluded the
United States Coast Guard failed to comply with the requisite NEPA
procedures when it promulgated regulations governing navigation
of oil-transporting vessels in Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts.30 The
First Circuit's decision marked the most recent holding in a pro-
longed and controversial battle between the conflicting approaches
of federal and state laws regulating maritime traffic to protect
against oil spills in Buzzards Bay.31 In its decision, the court de-
clined to address the issue of federal preemption, and instead fo-
cused on the Coast Guard's failure to comply with NEPA.3 2 As a
result, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts prevailed as the court
reinstated the state provisions governing vessels navigating through-
out Buzzards Bay instead of the less stringent, and typically control-
ling, federal oil spill regulations.33
This Note examines the First Circuit's rationale in Buzzards Bay
and analyzes the potential impact of its holding.34 The court's con-
clusion in Buzzards Bay challenges the predominance of federal in-
fluence on oil spill regulation 'and also illustrates NEPA's power to
contribute to substantial environmental developments.35 Part II
provides a detailed summary of the facts of Buzzards Bay.3 6 Part III
28. Id. at 28 (recognizing federal authority of Coast Guard to issue rules re-
garding tank vessel regulation, and Coast Guard's subsequent failure to comply
with NEPA).
29. 644 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2011).
30. Id. at 38-39 (holding Coast Guard did not satisfy NEPA obligations
through failure to properly assess environmental impacts of proposed regula-
tions). The Coast Guard's error "was one of function, not merely of form." Id. at
30. The First Circuit remanded the regulations at issue to the Coast Guard for
compliance with NEPA procedures. Id. at 39.
31. See id. at 28-29 (noting controversial nature of court's decision given ten-
sion between federal and state governments). The court noted that Buzzards Bay
is not only a "spectacularly beautiful natural resource but also a major channel of
maritime commerce." Id. at 28.
32. See id. at 28 (stating court need not discuss preemption issue because
Coast Guard violated NEPA).
33. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 39 (vacating injunction of MOSPA provisions
due to Coast Guard's non-compliance with NEPA); see also Tug of War, CAPE COD
TIMES, June 1, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 11202911 [hereinafter Tug of War]
(finding federal regulations governing coastal waters less stringent than state laws).
34. For a narrative analysis of Buzzards Bay, see infra notes 132-177 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the impact of the First Circuit's holding, see infra
notes 207-224 and accompanying text.
35. For a narrative analysis of Buzzards Bay, see infra notes 132-177 and accom-
panying text. For a critical analysis of the holding in this case, see infra notes 178-
206 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of the relevant facts of Buzzards Bay, see infra notes 41-79
and accompanying text.
6
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then describes the development of oil spill regulation in the United
States, the ongoing conflict between federal and state governance
of oil spill prevention, and NEPA's role in controversial issues of
environmental concern.37 Next, Part IV examines the rationale the
First Circuit employed to reach its holding.38 Thereafter, Part V
evaluates the court's rationale in light of the preemption question
surrounding oil spill regulation and the utilization of NEPA in
reaching its conclusion.39 Finally, Part VI considers the impact Buz-
zards Bay will have on the future governance of federal and state oil
spill regulation. 40
II. FAcrs
In Buzzards Bay, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit determined whether the Coast Guard complied with obliga-
tory NEPA procedures in promulgating rules for the regulation of
oil-transporting vessels in Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts. 41 Buzzards
Bay "is not only a spectacularly beautiful natural resource but also a
major channel of maritime commerce in southeastern Massachu-
setts." 42 Each year, an estimated two billion gallons of oil, gasoline,
and other hydrocarbons are transported through Buzzards Bay.43
Since an extensive oil spill devastated the bay in 2003, federal and
state authorities have struggled to agree on the appropriate level of
regulatory measures to prevent future oil spills. 4 4 Following years
37. For a discussion of background material pertaining to the oil spill regula-
tion, NEPA, and relevant court decisions, see infra notes 80-131 and accompanying
text.
38. For a narrative analysis of the court's opinion in Buzzards Bay, see infra
notes 132-177 and accompanying text.
39. For a critical analysis of the First Circuit's holding in Buzzards Bay, see
infra notes 178-206 and accompanying text.
40. For a discussion of the impact of the First Circuit's holding, see infra notes
207-224 and accompanying text.
41. United States v. Coal. for Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 2011)
(addressing relevant issues of case).
42. Id. (noting Buzzards Bay is both commercially and environmentally signif-
icant); see also Dr. Joe Costa, Twenty Years of Science and Management in Buzzards Bay,
BuzzARDs BAY NAT'L EsruARY PROGRAM (2005), http://www.buzzardsbay.org/
bbnep-anniversary.htm (discussing Congress's declaration of Buzzards Bay as "Es-
tuary of National Significance" and part of EPA's National Estuary Program (NEP)
under Clean Water Act). The NEP was established to protect and restore the water
quality and ecological integrity of estuaries of national significance. Id.
43. See Information on Oil Pollution in Buzzards Bay, BuzzARDs BAY NAT'L EsTu-
ARY PROGRAM, http://www.buzzardsbay.org/oilpollution.htm (last visited Mar. 8,
2012) (explaining why Buzzards Bay is major channel of shipping commerce).
44. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 28 (discussing conflict between federal and state
laws regulating maritime traffic on Buzzards Bay following 2003 oil spill). A
Bouchard Barge 120 released approximately 98,000 gallons of oil into Buzzards
1792012]
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of litigation, the First Circuit recently held the Coast Guard failed
to comply with its obligations under NEPA. 45 As a result, the court
reinstated Massachusetts' state laws governing the regulation of
Buzzards Bay. 4 6
In the aftermath of the Buzzards Bay oil spill, the Massachu-
setts state legislature enacted the Massachusetts Oil Spill Prevention
Act (MOSPA) in 2004.47 The federal government instantly tagged
MOSPA as a threat, claiming certain provisions would interfere with
its power to regulate commercial shipping in Buzzards Bay.48 The
federal government thus argued the PWSA preempted MOSPA,
certain sections of the United States Code, and requisite Coast
Guard regulations.49
The United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts initially granted an injunction against the challenged MOSPA
provisions and held that the federal PWSA preempted state laws
governing oil vessel reporting obligations.50 When Massachusetts
subsequently appealed, the First Circuit vacated the injunction and
Bay after striking an outcropping of rocks, which "soiled approximately ninety
miles of Buzzards Bay beaches and coastline, killed hundreds of birds and marine
life, contaminated thousands of acres of shellfish beds, and seriously harmed the
overall marine environment of the bay." United States v. Massachusetts (Massachu-
setts 1), 440 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2007).
45. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 28-29 (holding Coast Guard's failure to com-
ply with NEPA procedural obligations when instituting regulations relating to ves-
sel navigation in Buzzards Bay was not harmless). Specifically, because the Coast
Guard failed to conduct any sort of environmental analysis pertaining to the pro-
posed regulations, the First Circuit declined to enforce these federals regulations.
Id. at 29.
46. Id. at 29 (vacating injunction against Massachusetts oil spill regulations).
47. Id. at 29 (explaining introduction of MOSPA in response to 2003 Buz-
zards Bay oil spill); see also Marine Oil Spill Prevention & Response Program, MASS.
DEP'T OF ENvrL. PROT., [hereinafter Oil Spill Program] http://www.mass.gov/dep/
cleanup/oilsprep.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2012) (summarizing purpose of
MOSPA). "The purpose of the Act was to strengthen statutes governing Massachu-
setts' ability to prevent and respond to oil spills." Oil Spill Program, supra.
48. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 29 (discussing federal government's concern for
Massachusetts state laws infringing upon federal powers).
49. Id. (discussing federal government's challenge to state regulations con-
cerning oil vessels traveling in Massachusetts coastal waters).
50. See id. (describing district court's treatment of federal government's initial
complaint regarding MOSPA enactment); see also Massachusetts I, 440 F. Supp. 2d
24, 48 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding MOSPA
provisions to be "preempted, invalid, and unconstitutional" and enjoined enforce-
ment of statutes). Through the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, Congress has made it clear there are certain instances in which federal
actions preempt the enforcement of state laws. Massachusetts 1, 440 F.Supp. 2d at
29-30. The district court reasoned the federal government might be better posi-
tioned than the state to balance any competing interests that may arise in the regu-
lation of local waters. Id. at 32. After conducting a preemption analysis, the
8
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remanded the case to the district court.51 The First Circuit con-
cluded the district court incorrectly utilized the preemption analy-
sis for resolving federal-state conflicts.52 On remand, the focus of
litigation shifted after the Coast Guard promulgated a new final
rule in 2007 (2007 Rule) addressing the navigation of oil-transport-
ing vessels in Buzzards Bay.5 3 The 2007 Rule expressly stated fed-
eral law would preempt the manning and escort provisions of
MOSPA, thereby leaving no ambiguity regarding the issue of pre-
emption. 54 The manning provisions of MOSPA set forth require-
ments for how many licensed officers and personnel must be
present on vessels transporting oil in Buzzards Bay.5 5 The escort
district court concluded the PWSA had such an effect over the MOSPA, and or-
dered an injunction of the newly enacted MOSPA provisions. Id. at 48.
51. See United States v. Massachusetts (Massachusetts 1I), 493 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st
Cir. 2007), (explaining procedural posture of case and remanding case to district
court). The First Circuit held the district court acted "prematurely" and "did not
adhere to the analytical structure the Supreme Court has required to resolve fed-
eral-state conflicts in this area." Id. at 5.
52. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 29 (describing First Circuit's decision to va-
cate district court's injunction on MOSPA provisions and remand to district court
to engage in correct preemption analysis); see also Massachusetts II, 493 F.3d at 25
(holding district court erred in concluding PWSA left no room for state regulation
of coastal waters by applying incorrect model of preemption analysis). Massachu-
setts argued that in the absence of a conflicting federal regulation, states have
leeway to regulate particularly sensitive local waterways. Massachusetts II, 493 F.3d
at 4. The First Circuit noted the Supreme Court requires conflicts between federal
and state laws regarding protection against maritime oil spills be resolved in one of
three ways: conflict preemption analysis, field preemption analysis, or overlap pre-
emption analysis. Id. at 3. Here, the First Circuit determined the district court
used a field preemption analysis to conclude that provisions of the PWSA pre-
empted conflicting provisions of the MOSPA when the district court should have
used an overlap preemption analysis. Id. at 4.
53. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 29 (noting Coast Guard's promulgation of
final rule "changed the legal seascape" regarding navigation of Buzzards Bay); see
also United States v. Massachusetts (Massachusetts Ill), 724 F. Supp. 2d 170, 174
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 2010), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 644 F.3d 26 (1st. Cir. 2011)
(observing Coast Guard's express preemption in final rule forced Massachusetts to
attack federal regulations from procedural stance).
54. Regulated Navigation Area; Buzzards Bay, MA; Navigable Waterways
Within the First Coast Guard District, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,052-02, 50,056-57 (August
30, 2007) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 161, 165) [hereinafter Proposed Regula-
tions] (preempting state provisions). "To the extent not otherwise already pre-
empted, this rule is intended to, and does, preempt those provisions of [MOSPA) regarding
enhanced manning requirements for tank barges and tow vessels in Buzzards Bay,
and tugboat escorts for certain waters . . . ." Id. (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
55. See generally MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21M, § 4 (West, Westlaw through
2012) (setting forth specific personnel requirements for oil-transporting vessels
traversing through Buzzards Bay).
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provisions of MOSPA mandated certain oil-transporting vessels
could not traverse Buzzards Bay without a tugboat escort.56
The 2007 Rule resolved the question of federal preemption in
favor of the Coast Guard, which forced Massachusetts to utilize an
alternative avenue to challenge the conflicting federal regula-
tions.57 The Commonwealth asserted the Coast Guard violated
NEPA and certain provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) when it promulgated the 2007 Rule.5 8 The district court
ruled the Coast Guard violated NEPA by failing to adhere to the
obligatory NEPA procedural requirement of preparing either an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or an Environmental As-
sessment (EA).59 The district court, however, concluded this fail-
ure was "harmless error," entered judgment for the Coast Guard,
and enjoined enforcement of MOSPA provisions.60
On appeal, the First Circuit again addressed the conflict be-
tween federal and state law involving the manning and escort re-
quirements for vessels navigating in Buzzards Bay.61 The
disagreement between the federal and state approaches to the regu-
lation of oil barges in Buzzards Bay arose because the Coast Guard
provisions required substantially less stringent levels of oversight
and regulation than the MOSPA provisions.62 MOSPA required
56. See id. § 6 (establishing specific escort requirements for oil-transporting
vessels traveling through Massachusetts waters).
57. See Massachusetts II, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 174 (explaining Massachusetts'
introduction of new argument alleging Coast Guard violated NEPA in failing to
prepare EIS without explanation).
58. United States v. Coal. for Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2011)
(discussing Commonwealth's counterclaims alleging Coast Guard's procedural
violations).
59. Massachusetts III, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 174 (explaining Coast Guard's failure
to provide EIS for 2007 Rule "can only be described as an act of procedural
hubris"). The Coast Guard did not explain their failure to provide any sort of
environmental analyses, and erroneously concluded the 2007 Rule was not "highly
controversial in terms of scientific validity or public opinion[.]" Id. (internal quo-
tations omitted).
60. Id. at 175 (holding Coast Guard's procedural violation of NEPA in failing
to present EA or EIS was harmless because Coast Guard's rulemaking process was
functionally equivalent to environmental analysis). The district court reasoned
that to require a more formal assessment would be a "waste of time" because Mas-
sachusetts could not identify any environmental issues left unaddressed by the
Coast Guard in the rulemaking process. Id. (internal quotations omitted). For a
further discussion of harmless error, see infra notes 167-175 and accompanying
text.
61. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 29-30 (assessing nature of conflicting federal
and state provisions governing Buzzards Bay navigation).
62. Id. at 36 (noting Coast Guard 2007 Rule was subject to widespread opposi-
tion). "In the view of many, the proposed rule threatened to decrease materially
the level of protection against oil spills in Buzzards Bay." Id. Massachusetts was
10
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tugboat escorts for all vessels carrying six thousand or more barrels
of oil transiting Buzzards Bay.63 The 2007 Rule conversely required
tug escorts for single-hulled barges and allowed double-hulled
barges to navigate without a tugboat escort.6 This provision was
especially important because the OPA has called for the complete
phase out of single-hulled tank barges by 2015.65 Thus, beginning
in 2015, the 2007 Rule would leave all tank vessels transporting oil
through Buzzards Bay unescorted. 66
MOSPA further commands all tow vessels transiting Buzzards
Bay and carrying six thousand or more barrels of oil have at least
one licensed deck officer or tow vessel operator to serve as a look-
out on board at all times.6 7 Additionally, MOSPA requires three
officers or tow vessel operators man a tow vessel when it is escorting
a tank barge.68 The 2007 Rule took a divergent approach to man-
primarily concerned that Coast Guard regulations were too narrow, as they only
required escort requirements of single-hulled tank barges instead of all tank
barges. Id.
63. Id. at 29-30 (describing Massachusetts' tugboat escort requirements); see
also MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21M, § 6(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012) (requir-
ing tank vessels carrying six thousand or more barrels of oil to be escorted by
tugboat).
64. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 54, at 50,059 (stating tug escorts
must accompany only single-hull tank barges in Buzzards Bay to prevent barges
from danger of grounding or collision in event of accident); see also 33 C.F.R.
§ 138.220(b) (2011) (defining single hull); 33 C.F.R. § 157.03 (2011) (defining
double hull). The Coast Guard excluded double-hull barges from the escort re-
quirement because they are well equipped to withstand grounding or collisions
and there has never been a major oil spill from a double-hull tank barge in Buz-
zards Bay. Proposed Regulations, supra note 54, at 50,054. "[S]ingle-hull means
the hull of a tank vessel that is constructed or adapted to carry, or that carries, oil
in bulk as cargo or cargo residue, that is not a double hull as defined in 33 CFR
part 157." 33 C.F.R. § 138.220(b) (2011). "Double hull means watertight protec-
tive spaces that do not carry any oil and which separate the sides, bottom, forward
end, and aft end of tanks that hold any oil within the cargo tank length from the
outer skin of the vessel as prescribed in § 157.10d." 33 C.F.R. § 157.03 (2011).
65. See Ramseur, supra note 5, at 14 (noting OPA calls for complete phase-out
of all double-hulled barges by 2015).
66. See Press Release, Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General Martha
Coakley, First Circuit Reinstates Oil Spill Prevention Measures for Buzzards Bay
(May 20, 2011), [hereinafter Coakley Press Release] http://www.mass.gov/ago/
news-and-updates/press-releases/201 1/first-circuit-reinstates-oil-spill-prevention.
html (discussing consequences of 2007 Rule when acting in concert with certain
provisions of OPA).
67. United States v. Coal. for Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2011)
(describing Massachusetts vessel manning requirements); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 21M, § 4(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012) (setting manning requirement
for one lookout licensed deck officer on tow vessels transiting Buzzards Bay).
68. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 30 (describing additional vessel manning re-
quirements); see also MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 21M, § 4(a) (West, Westlaw through
2012) (providing manning requirements to include crew of three licensed officers
for tow vessels pulling or pushing tank barges in Buzzards Bay).
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ning regulations and required only one pilot be present to direct
single-hull barges.69
The substance of the public comments submitted in response
to the proposal of the 2007 Rule properly illustrates the serious na-
ture of the ongoing conflict between federal and state navigation
regulations for Buzzards Bay.70 These comments reflected fervent
concern about the detrimental environmental effects of replacing
the MOSPA provisions with less stringent federal regulations.71
Worried local officials, state legislators, and other state government
representatives urged the Coast Guard to adopt stricter tug escort
standards similar to those included in MOSPA, contending that tug
escorts for all tank barges-not just single-hulled vessels-were nec-
essary to reduce the risk of oil spills in Buzzards Bay.72
With the question of preemption no longer at issue, the First
Circuit focused solely on NEPA compliance in its most recent re-
view of the Buzzards Bay conflict.73 Relying on APA standards for
evaluating agency actions, the First Circuit analyzed the Coast
Guard regulations to determine whether it complied with NEPA
procedures, and thereby possessed the authority to set any regula-
tions aside that were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law."74
69. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 54, at 50,509 (stating each single-
hull tank barge carrying oil in Buzzards Bay must be directed and controlled by
pilot).
70. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 36 (discussing concerns voiced in comments
to proposed rule submitted to Coast Guard).
71. Id. (observing strong opposition toward Coast Guard's 2007 Rule). Many
members of the public believed "protections beyond those described in the pro-
posed rule were needed to prevent environmental damage to Buzzards Bay." Id.
72. Id. (describing extent of strong public and congressional resistance to
2007 Rule). But see Swanson, supra note 5, at 380-81 (suggesting instituting less
stringent tank vessel standards would conflict with constitutional mandate of fed-
eral maritime uniformity).
73. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 30-31 (noting court's instant analysis focused on
NEPA compliance).
74. Id. at 30 (noting arbitrary and capricious review standard of administrative
law); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2006) (discussing to what extent court may
hold agency actions to be unlawful); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1258, 1267 (1st Cir. 1987) (describing responsibility of
courts under arbitrary and capricious standard). When reviewing agency actions,
courts seek to determine if "the agency [ ] adequately explained the facts and poli-
cies upon which it relied" to reach their decision. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc.,
824 F.2d at 1267. Courts will only "delve into the soundness of the agency's rea-
soning only to ascertain that the conclusions reached are rationally supported."
Id. The scope of the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard is beyond the scope
of this Note, as the First Circuit did not reach the issue in Buzzards Bay. See Buz-
zards Bay, 644 F.3d at 31.
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In Buzzards Bay, the Coast Guard argued NEPA's requirement
that federal agencies prepare an EA or EIS for any major agency
action was not absolute and it was exempt from this requirement
under regulations established by the Council for Environmental
Quality (CEQ) .7 When promulgating the 2007 Rule, the Coast
Guard adopted supplemental procedures providing categorical ex-
clusions (CEs) for its responsibility to issue an EA or EIS.76 The
Commonwealth countered that the Coast Guard's reliance on the
exemptions did not apply in "extraordinary circumstances" and the
highly controversial nature of federal and state navigation laws in
Massachusetts qualified as an extraordinary circumstance.7 7 The
First Circuit agreed with the Commonwealth and concluded the
manning and escort requirements were indeed highly controver-
sial, and as such, the Coast Guard was obligated to conduct a formal
environmental analysis under NEPA.78 Accordingly, the court held
that the Coast Guard's failure to satisfy its NEPA obligations was not
a harmless error and vacated the district court's injunction of the
relevant MOSPA provisions.79
75. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 29-30 (discussing Coast Guard's contention that
its regulations qualified for EA and EIS exemptions). A categorical exclusion ap-
plies when a certain action does not "individually or cumulatively have a significant
effect on the human environment and [has] been found to have no such effect in
procedures adopted by a Federal agency in implementation of [the action]." Id. at
31-32.
76. Id. at 32 (discussing Coast Guard's adoption of supplemental procedures
that provide for certain exemptions from abiding by NEPA procedures); see also
COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION M16475.ID, UNITED STATES COAST GuAR 2-4-2-9 (Nov.
29, 2000) [hereinafter COMDTINST M16475.ID], available at http://www.uscg.
mil/directives/cim/16000-16999/CIM_16475-1D.pdf (stating purpose of Coast
Guard supplemental procedures). The supplemental procedures provided exclu-
sions for "regulations establishing, disestablishing, or changing Regulated Naviga-
tion Areas and security of safety zones and regulations in aid of navigation."
Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 32 (citations and quotations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The stated purpose of COMDTINST M16476.ID is to establish
policies and procedures to ensure appropriate environmental review and NEPA
compliance measures for Coast Guard actions. COMDTINST M16475.ID, supra, at
1-1.
77. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 35 (discussing Commonwealth's argument
that proposed Coast Guard action was "highly controversial" and constituted an
"extraordinary circumstance" preventing agency action from being exempted from
NEPA requirements).
78. See id. at 35-36, 38 (deciding Coast Guard violated obligatory NEPA proce-
dures by failing to issue EA or EIS for promulgated oil-transporting vessel
regulations).
79. Id. at 39 (ordering remand to Coast Guard for further proceedings); see
also Oil Spill Act Information, MAss. DEP'T OF ENvrTL. PROT. (July 14, 2011), http://
www.mass.gov/dep/cleanup/laws/spillact.htm (announcing official reinstatement
of MOSPA provisions). Following the court's decision, "[o]n July 11, 2011, the
First Circuit issued its mandate, which lifted the injunction that had prevented
MassDEP from implementing and enforcing MOSPA's manning and Tugboat Es-
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III. BACKGROUND
A. More Boats, More Spills: Oil-Transporting Vessel Regulation
is Born
The United States has long recognized the importance of es-
tablishing regulatory oversight of maritime vessels to protect and
preserve United States' waters.80 Congress first manifested this
commitment to keeping our waterways safe and clean in its passage
of the Tank Vessel Act of 1936.81 In the early 1970s, maritime vessel
regulation gained widespread attention as oil spills became more
prevalent.82 Emerging environmental concerns resulted in vessel
regulations that not only instituted safety measures but also pro-
tected marine habitats.83 Accordingly, Congress significantly ex-
panded the federal government's role in regulating dangerous
vessels by enacting the PWSA, which consists of two titles regulating
different, yet overlapping, aspects of maritime oil transportation. 8 4
Title I of the PWSA delegates to the Coast Guard the authority to
promulgate regulations governing the traffic and navigation of ves-
sels and protection of the marine environment.85 Title II requires
the Coast Guard to issue rules pertaining to the "design, construc-
tion, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, person-
cort requirements" for vessels traversing Buzzards Bay. MASS. DEP'T OF ENvrL.
PROT., supra.
80. See Brooks, supra note 5, at 230 (discussing early Congressional recogni-
tion of need to regulate transport of dangerous vessels).
81. See Tank Vessel Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-765, ch. 729, 49 Stat. 1889
(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 3301(10), 3702, 8502 (2006)) (delineating
provisions of Tank Vessel Act of 1936); see also Brooks, supra note 5, at 230 (discuss-
ing background of Tank Vessel Act of 1936). The purpose of the Tank Vessel Act
was to promote safe vessel transport of both cargo and seamen, and specified re-
quirements for the design, operation, and manning of vessels. Brooks, supra note
5, at 230. The Tank Vessel Act was the sole federal command governing the regu-
lation of oil-transporting vessels until the passage of the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act in 1972. Id. at 230-31.
82. See Brooks, supra note 5, at 230-32 (noting heightened federal involve-
ment in regulation of design and construction of oil tankers as oil transportation
increased and spills became more frequent).
83. Id. at 230-31 (discussing growing popularity of environmental issues in
United States and its relation to more stringent oil tanker regulation).
84. See generally Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-
1232 (2006) (noting elements of Title I of PWSA); Ports and Waterways Safety Act
of 1978, 46 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3718 (2006) (noting elements of Title II of PWSA and
describing reasons for enacting PWSA). The PWSA strives to promote "navigation
and vessel safety, protection of the marine environment, and safety and security of
United States ports and waterways." Ports and Waterways Safety Act § 1221 (a).
85. See Ports and Waterways Safety Act § 1223(a) (authorizing Secretary of
Transportation to improve vessel navigation safety).
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nel qualification, and manning of vessels [.]"6 The extensive
authority bestowed upon the Coast Guard highlighted the federal
government's role in the regulation of vessels and oil spill
prevention.87
As the oil transport industry increasingly threatened United
States' waterways, states also began to enact stricter regulations to
monitor vessels and protect coastal waterways from the possibility of
oil spills.8 8 Conflicts between these state laws and the overarching
federal laws soon followed, evoking questions as to what extent a
system of uniform federal laws would preempt state regulations.8 9
Proponents of federal preemption argue stricter state laws frustrate
the goal of creating a uniform national shipping industry, whereas
opponents argue states should be permitted to set stiffer standards
if they so desire.90
B. Battle of the Laws: Conquering the Federal Preemption
Question
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the question
of federal preemption as it applied to oil spill prevention and re-
sponse requirements in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Company (Ray).91 In
Ray, the Court held the PWSA provisions regulating the design and
86. See Ports and Waterways Safety Act § 3703(a) (requiring Secretary of
Transportation to promulgate regulations related to overall operation of vessels to
protect against hazards to life, property, vessel safety, and marine environment);
see also Brooks, supra note 5, at 231 (summarizing Title II of PWSA).
87. See Ports and Waterways Safety Act § 1221 (2006) (creating federal policy
to respond to increasing danger of vessel traffic in nation's waterways); see also
Brooks, supra note 5, at 231 (noting enactment of PWSA extended Coast Guard
and federal government's power to regulate coastal waters).
88. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 94 (2000) (discussing both federal
and state creation of more stringent oil transport regulations following large-scale
oil spills). In 1967, the American oil tanker Torrey Canyon spilled 120,000 tons of
oil off the coast of England, and in 1989 the supertanker Exxon Valdez spilled
more than fifty-three million gallons of oil off the coast of Alaska. Id. Such inci-
dents consistently prompted federal and state initiatives to increase preventative
measures in oil tanker regulation. Id.
89. See, e.g., Locke, 529 U.S. at 94 (explaining "ensuing question of federal pre-
emption" regarding danger of tanker oil spills); Ramseur, supra note 5, at 24 (not-
ing "primary obstacle" to achieving unified oil spill regulation was whether federal
laws would preempt state laws); Swanson, supra note 5, at 380 (illustrating lack of
clarity on how federal and state laws governing oil spill prevention were to
interact).
90. See Ramseur, supra note 5, at 24 (discussing arguments for and against
federal preemption of oil spill legislation).
91. See Ray v. Ad. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1978) (addressing con-
flict between federal PWSA provisions and Washington state regulations). These
regulations concerned the "design, size, and movement of oil tankers in Puget
Sound." Id.
2012] 187
15
Braeuer: A Slick Situation: The First Circuit Creates a Buzz and Turns to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
188 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. XXIII: p. 173
construction of vessels preempted conflicting state maritime safety
laws and emphasized the importance of uniformity in oil tanker
regulation.92 The Court, however, also acknowledged state regula-
tions can be enforced when they address purely local issues and the
goals do not conflict with any substantive federal law.93
Despite such efforts by the Supreme Court to clarify state and
federal jurisdiction of oil spill governance in Ray, it was still largely
unclear which state oil-transporting vessel regulations might over-
come federal preemption.94 The Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster ad-
ded to the confusion and led to the passage of the OPA.95 The
OPA amended the PWSA and attempted to refine oil spill regula-
tion by combining the existing federal laws into one program, ex-
panding liability provisions, and imposing new requirements
regarding oil spill prevention and response. 96 The OPA is extensive
and intricate; consisting of nine titles that address such matters as:
liability and compensation, licensing requirements, duties of of-
ficers, manning and reporting standards, and tank vessel construc-
tion. 97 The passage of the OPA, however, did not fully resolve
questions of federal and state jurisdiction over oil spill legislation,
particularly in regarding oil tanker vessel regulation.98
92. Id. at 165 (finding in favor of federal preemption for laws governing Pu-
get Sound vessels). The Court found, "The Supremacy Clause dictates that the
federal judgment that a vessel is safe to navigate United States waters prevail over
the contrary state judgment." Id.
93. Id. at 164 (explaining states may enforce their own local laws as long as
they do not directly conflict with federal laws). The Court determined the Wash-
ington laws at issue in Ray addressed general vessel safety rather than local con-
cerns, and were therefore preempted by federal provisions governing the issue. Id.
at 164-65.
94. See Brooks, supra note 5, at 234 (noting lack of clarify on local states rules
in instances not specifically addressed in Ray).
95. See generally Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2006) (ex-
plaining OPA mandates and requirements); see also United States v. Locke, 529
U.S. 89, 101 (2000) (noting Exxon Valdez spill prompted enactment of OPA); Oil
Pollution Act Overview, U.S. ENrL. PROTEMCTON AGENCY (Jan. 28, 2011), http://
www.epa.gov/osweroel/content/lawsregs/opaover.htm (discussing history and
overview of OPA). For a more detailed discussion of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, see
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
96. See Ramseur, supra note 5, at 12-17 (summarizing key purposes of OPA).
97. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 101-02 (discussing extensive nature of nine titles that
make up OPA).
98. See id. at 94 (observing ongoing controversy between federal regulatory
schemes governing oil tankers and conflicting state laws); see also Swanson, supra
note 5, at 380 (explaining why OPA did not necessarily cure conflict between fed-
eral and state oil spill laws). The OPA allowed application of state law in certain
areas "without fully clarifying how federal and state law were to interact." Swanson,
supra note 5, at 380.
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The Supreme Court most recently addressed the battle be-
tween federal and state authority of oil spill governance in the semi-
nal decision of United States v. Locke (Locke) ." In Locke, the Court
limited the degree to which state rules on oil spill prevention can
avoid federal preemption. 00 Locke concerned the validity of the
State of Washington's oil spill prevention laws involving oil tanker
design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. 101 The
Court compared Washington's law to both the PWSA and the OPA
and concluded federal laws would almost always preempt conflict-
ing state laws regarding maritime oil commerce. 0 2 Locke provided
for the preservation of state laws in light of the federal laws if they
concerned the liability of oil spills. 103 The Court, however, strongly
rejected state involvement in the operation, manning, equipping,
and construction of oil-transporting vessels.104
99. Locke, 529 U.S. at 94 (identifying and explaining federal preemption is-
sue). The court stated, "Today we must determine whether these more recent
state laws can stand despite the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme gov-
erning oil tankers." Id.
100. See Brooks, supra note 5, at 262 (describing Court's ruling in Locke to
strongly reflect favoring of federal authority).
101. Locke, 529 U.S. at 97 (discussing state regulations at issue). The Court
noted Washington's coastal waters were subject to large amounts of oil transport
due to its vicinity to major waterways and subsequent role as a shipping hub for the
oil industry. Id. at 95. Because of the vast amount of oil transported throughout
Washington's waters, the state established strict spill prevention standards to pro-
vide "the best achievable protection [ ] from damages caused by the discharge of
oil." Id. at 97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. See id. at 107 (upholding long-established principle from Ray that federal
law will preempt state law in maritime commerce regulation). The Court noted,
"state laws now in question bear upon national and international maritime com-
merce, and in this area there is no beginning assumption that concurrent regula-
tion by the State is a valid exercise of its police powers." Id. at 108. The test to
determine the validity of state oil regulation laws depends on whether local laws
are consistent with federal statutes, which are written to ensure uniformity of regu-
lation for maritime commerce. Id. The Court pointed to the PWSA, reiterating
that Title I of the Act gives states some leeway in regulating local ports and waters,
but Title II strictly requires the promulgation of uniform, national rules regarding
the general design, operation, and seaworthiness of oil-transporting vessels. Id. at
108-09.
103. Id. at 105 (discussing Court's reasoning). "The evident purpose of the
saving clauses is to preserve state laws which, rather than imposing substantive reg-
ulation of a vessel's primary conduct, establish liability rules and financial require-
ments relating to oil spills." Id.
104. Id. (confirming OPA saving clauses apply only to state oil spill liability
laws, not vessel operation, design, or manning guidelines).
1892012]
17
Braeuer: A Slick Situation: The First Circuit Creates a Buzz and Turns to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
190 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII: p. 173
C. Introducing NEPA: Recognizing a Newfound Environmental
Commitment
As oil spill regulation of United States' coastal waters gained
increasing attention, the introduction of NEPA began to revolu-
tionize the landscape of environmental law in the United States.' 05
NEPA presented ambitious political goals and unprecedented ini-
tiatives, illustrating the federal government's newfound commit-
ment to protecting the environment.106 The implementation of
NEPA silenced the critics averring federal agencies lacked direction
and incentive to incorporate environmental values into agency ac-
tions. 107 Referred to as "our basic national charter for protection of
the environment," 08 NEPA established a basic policy to ensure the
government gave suitable consideration to the environment before
undertaking any major federal action that might pose environmen-
tal risk.109 In one respect, NEPA directs administrative agencies to
consider every significant environmental impact from proposed ac-
tions.'10 Additionally, NEPA ensures each agency notifies the pub-
105. See Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 193 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (observing notion of NEPA as "environmentalist Magna Carta"); James
T.B. Tripp & Nathan G. Alley, Streamlining NEPA's Environmental Review Process: Sug-
gestions for Agency Reform, 12 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 74, 75-76 (2003) (discussing signifi-
cance of NEPA's contribution to environmental law reform and awareness in
United States).
106. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335
(2006) (declaring federal commitment to preservation and conservation of envi-
ronment); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348
(1989) (discussing overarching goals of NEPA). Congress recognized the impor-
tance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality and enacted NEPA "to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in produc-
tive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present
and future generations of Americans." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). The Supreme Court
stated, "NEPA declares a broad national commitment to protecting and promoting
environmental quality." Robertson, 490 U.S. at 348.
107. See Dreher, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing factors contributing to NEPA's
creation). It became clear agencies were instituting actions that would come to
have "irreversible consequences" in causing environmental harm. Id. NEPA was
created to minimize this harm by ordering agencies to adequately consider the
impact their actions might have on the environment. Id.
108. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (a) (2011) (stating basic purpose of NEPA is to protect
environment).
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (mandating all federal agencies comply with NEPA
procedures to achieve desirable levels of environmental awareness and preserva-
tion); Balt. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97
(1983) (discussing general policy objectives of NEPA); Alm, supra note 25 (summa-
rizing overarching goal of NEPA to protect environment).
110. Balt. Gas and Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 97 (discussing NEPA's initial aim of
obligating agencies to consider environmental consequences any agency actions
may have).
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lic that it gave proper consideration to relevant environmental
concerns as a part of their decision-making process."'
NEPA provides a straightforward procedural framework to ful-
fill its environmental objectives in a simple and constructive man-
ner." 2 The most significant NEPA requirement directs all federal
agencies to prepare detailed statements assessing the environmen-
tal impact of and alternatives to major federal actions significantly
affecting the environment. 13 This is accomplished through the
preparation of an EIS or EA.11 4 An EIS addresses all apparent ad-
verse environmental impacts of a proposed action, acknowledges
avenues of possible mitigation alternatives, identifies what kind of
resources would have to be utilized, and responds to outside par-
ties' comments on the issue.115
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), an organiza-
tion created by NEPA, advises the President on issues relating to
environmental quality.116 The CEQ promulgates regulations to
guide agencies when determining which actions require the prepa-
ration of an EIS.' 17 These regulations also allow for the more lim-
ited analysis of an EA." 8 An agency should prepare an EA when it
111. Id. (discussing NEPA's second goal of ensuring public is kept informed
of all environmental impacts of proposed agency actions); see also Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (observing availability of
environmental information to public is critical as public's response can potentially
affect agency decision making).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)-(v) (listing steps federal agencies must take
when considering environmental impacts of actions); see also Alm, supra note 25
(discussing simple procedural structure of NEPA established to carry out substan-
tial environmental goals); Tripp & Alley, supra note 105, at 79 (describing NEPA
process as simple and "straightforward").
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (requiring proposals for federal actions that sig-
nificantly affect environment to contain detailed statements noting environmental
impacts, adverse environmental effects, and any potential alternatives to action
proposed); see also Dreher, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing environmental assessment
measures to be NEPA's "action-forcing mechanism" to reduce environmental dam-
age stemming from federal agency actions).
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (describing factors to be taken into considera-
tion for NEPA environmental analysis).
115. Id. (listing statutory requirements of EIS); Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351-52
(discussing EIS requirements).
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (creating CEQ). The CEQ was established to assist
the President in "formulat[ing] and recommend[ing] national policies to promote
the improvement of the quality of the environment." Id.
117. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (noting requirements of EIS); 40 C.F.R.
§ 1507.3 (2011) (explaining specific procedures agencies must abide by in prepar-
ing EIS). NEPA commands that any federal agency action affecting the quality of
the environment requires "a detailed statement by the responsible official on [ ]
the environmental impact of the proposed action[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
118. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2011) (setting forth requirements for less inten-
sive analyses of EA).
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is uncertain whether the potential impacts of a project are environ-
mentally significant.119 NEPA imposes these environmental analysis
requirements on agencies with the hope that an enhanced knowl-
edge base will cause agencies to make more informed and less envi-
ronmentally damaging decisions. 120
Agencies can identify actions that do not "have a significant
effect on the human environment" as categorical exclusions
(CEs).1 21 By designating an action as a CE, the agency does not
have to prepare an EIS or EA. 122 Agency reliance on CEs to evade
any sort of environmental analysis regarding agency actions, how-
ever, is often the subject of legal challenges.123 Under the APA,
NEPA violations are subject to judicial review, and courts have the
authority to decide whether an agency's failure to comply with the
119. See Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004) (noting
CEQ regulations permitted agencies to conduct more limited environmental anal-
ysis in EA rather than EIS). In an EA, an agency is required to briefly analyze
whether the preparation of an extensive EIS is necessary. Id. If the agency deter-
mines an EIS is not required under the applicable CEQ regulations, it can issue a
"finding of no significant impact (FONSI)," which presents the reasons the action
will not have a significant impact on the human environment. Id. at 757-58 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
120. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2011) (explaining NEPA's goals); see also Robert-
son v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989) (noting NEPA
requires agencies to adequately identify and evaluate all environmental costs and
prohibits uninformed and unwise decisions); Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946,
952 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting when agencies make decisions without considering en-
vironmental impacts, "harm that NEPA intends to prevent has been suffered");
Susannah T. French, judicial Review of the Administrative Record in AEPA Litigation,
Comment, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 946-47 (July 1993) (describing purpose of
NEPA's educational function). The requirement of accurate EAs and EISs is im-
portant because without public knowledge of environmental risks, NEPA is unable
to obtain desired levels of environmental protection. French, supra, at 947. "The
NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on
understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, re-
store, and enhance the environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c).
121. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2011) (defining categorical exclusion); see also 40
C.F.R. § 1501.4(a) (2) (stating federal agencies may not have to require EIS or EA
if proposed regulations fall into categorical exclusion). Categorical exclusions in-
clude actions "which have been found to have no such effect in procedures
adopted by a Federal agency in implementation of these regulations." 40 C.F.R.§ 1508.4.
122. See Town of Marshfield v. FAA, 552 F.3d 1, 2-4 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding
CE regarding aircraft rerouting measures employed by FAA exempted agency
from preparing EA or EIS); Wilderness Watch & Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibil-
ity v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1094-95 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining applicability of
CEs to except agencies from usual NEPA review procedures).
123. See French, supra note 120, at 947 (observing typical environmental chal-
lenges to agency decisions involve NEPA violations and include alleged failures to
prepare EIS).
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procedural NEPA obligations constitutes a harmless error. 12 4 If the
court concludes previous environmental studies illustrate the same
impact analysis an EA or EIS would, it renders harmless the failure
to provide either report and waives the obligation. 125
Despite its substantive foundation, the Supreme Court has
held NEPA is primarily a procedural law.126 NEPA cannot require
agencies to favor environmental concerns over other considerations
in assessing agency actions. 127 Instead, NEPA only mandates an
agency take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of
the proposed actions.' 2 8 In essence, NEPA lacks the power to com-
pel agencies to act in any particular way.129 This largely procedural
quality of NEPA has resulted in criticism, leading to assertions that
NEPA is ineffective, time consuming, and expensive, especially
124. See Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 61 (1st Cir. 2001) (apply-
ing doctrine of harmless error to judicial review of administrative actions). The
First Circuit noted that in certain circumstances, it is illogical to require an envi-
ronmental analysis when the agency already made a reasoned finding that the envi-
ronmental effects of an action would be de minimis. Id. at 61-62. In such
circumstances the court has the authority to decide the error was harmless and
waive statutory requirements, so long as environmental effects were reasonably
taken into account. Id. at 62.
125. See id. (noting as long as negative environmental effects were reasonably
taken into account it is not necessary to demand another environmental analysis).
Once an action's consequences are analyzed and found to be absent, agency mis-
takes can be disregarded if it is clear that an additional analysis would only cause
further expense and delay. Id. at 61-62.
126. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989) (emphasizing NEPA's focus on process of disclosing environmental infor-
mation rather than mandating substantive results); see also Balt. Gas and Elec. Co.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983) (noting role of courts
in analyzing NEPA obligations to ensure agencies adequately consider and disclose
all environmental impacts of their actions); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (explaining NEPA's pri-
mary function is reflected in procedural mandate to ensure administrative agency
decisions are fully informed and considered). "[I]t is now well settled that NEPA
itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary pro-
cess." Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.
127. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980) (holding role of courts is only to ensure agencies complied with NEPA
procedures in assessing environmental consequences, not to mandate certain
course of action).
128. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008)
(mandating agencies to comply with NEPA's environmental assessment obligations
to properly inform agency and public about any and all environmental harm that
may ensue); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (emphasizing
courts cannot replace agency determinations with their own judgment regarding
environmental consequences of its agency actions so long as agency reached such
determinations lawfully).
129. See Dreher, supra note 4, at 3 (noting NEPA does not require federal
agencies to select most environmentally-friendly option).
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when courts are inclined to defer to agency findings. 30 Nonethe-
less, NEPA has met its goal of instilling a degree of environmental
awareness in federal agencies over the past forty years of its
existence.' 3 '
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
"In this case, our task begins and ends with the issue of
NEPA compliance." 13 2
In Buzzards Bay, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit recognized the significance of the distinction between fed-
eral and state preventative measures for oil spill protection. 33 The
First Circuit, however, declined to address the familiar federal pre-
emption question surrounding oil spill governance, but instead em-
phasized the role of NEPA compliance for the promulgations of
federal Coast Guard regulations. 134
A. Are Agencies Ever Exempt from NEPA Obligations? The
Coast Guard's Supplemental Procedures
The First Circuit initially noted the Coast Guard's obligation to
conduct an EA or EIS under NEPA can at times be relinquished if
130. See, e.g., Tripp & Alley, supra note 105, at 81-82 (observing many agency
officials regard NEPA process as burdensome, timely, and costly); Mike Soraghan,
AEPA Reviews Could Stall Return of Offshore Drilling Projects in Deep Water, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/02/03/03green-
wire-nepa-reviews-could-stall-return-of-offshore-dr-20907.html?pagewanted=all
(noting EIS in certain instances can cost over one million dollars and take up to a
year to complete).
131. See ENVTL. LAw INST., NEPA SUCCEss STORIES: CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF
TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN GoVERNMENT 5-8 (2008) [hereinafter NEPA SUCCEss STO-
RIES], available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepainformation/NEPA-SuccessSto-
ries.pdf (asserting NEPA has changed governmental decision-making for better
and procedures employed by NEPA achieved many environmental successes); see
also Dreher, supra note 4, at 4-7 (discussing instances of NEPA success). Dreher
contends, "NEPA has unquestionably improved the quality of federal agency deci-
sion-making in terms of its sensitivity to environmental concerns." Dreher, supra
note 4, at 4.
132. United States v. Coal. for Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2011)
(focusing on NEPA compliance as main issue driving First Circuit's analysis).
133. See id. at 28 (observing overarching issue was federal preemption of state
oil-transporting vessel laws). The First Circuit alluded to the federal preemption
issue that seemingly guided the case, and noted the oil spill in Buzzards Bay
"sparked a pitched battle between federal and state sovereigns over the nature of
preventative measures needed to safeguard against the risk of oil spills." Id.
134. Id. (deciding to ignore federal preemption issue and instead address
whether federal oil spill rules promulgated by the Coast Guard complied with
NEPA procedures).
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the action at issue is "categorically excluded."135 The Coast Guard
included such exclusions in its supplemental procedures, codified
in Commandment Instruction M16475.ID (COMDTINST
M16475.ID).13 6 The court agreed the 2007 Rule did meet some of
the exclusions listed in COMDTINST M16475.ID, but also noted
that a CE designation does not automatically relieve an agency of
the obligation to prepare either an EA or EIS.137 Moreover,
COMDTINST.M16475.ID notes there are instances in which an ac-
tion may be excluded, but also constitute an "extraordinary circum-
stance," and thus still require the preparation of an EA or EIS.138
The Coast Guard asserted it possessed the discretion to deter-
mine whether any of the extraordinary circumstances applied to
the 2007 Rule.139 Exercising this exclusive authority, the Coast
Guard concluded none of the extraordinary circumstances applied
to the promulgation of the 2007 Rule, and accordingly the prepara-
tion of any type of environmental analysis was not necessary. 140 The
court, however, disagreed. 141 The court noted that in addition to
the Coast Guard's own supplemental procedures, the Coast Guard
also must adhere to an incorporated Department of Transportation
order (DOT order).142 The DOT order, which was included in
COMDTINST M16475.ID, provides another set of extraordinary cir-
cumstances. 143 These circumstances overlap the Coast Guard's sup-
plemental procedure and specifically mandate an EA or EIS if a
135. See id. at 31 (explaining pertinence of categorical exclusions). When a
proposed action does not have a significant effect on the environment it can be
exempted from preparing an EIS or EA. Id. at 32.
136. Id. at 32 (noting Coast Guard adoption of supplemental procedures); see
also COMDTINST M16475.ID, supra note 76 (listing thirty-five applicable CEs)
137. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 32 (stating agency may still be required to con-
duct EA or EIS for final rule despite applicability of CE). The Coast Guard
pointed to two CEs applicable to the 2007 Rule: (1) the regulation established,
disestablished or changed Regulated Navigation Areas and security or safety zones,
and (2) the regulation aided navigation. Id.
138. Id. at 32 (discussing Coast Guard procedures that noted CEs may involve
extraordinary circumstances and require EA or EIS despite designation as exclu-
sion). The court cited CEQ regulations require preparation of an EA or EIS if the
action being excluded has a "significant environmental effect." Id. (citation
omitted).
139. Id. at 33 (discussing Coast Guard contention that it has ability to inter-
pret its own supplemental procedures).
140. Id. at 32-33 (discussing Coast Guard implication that its NEPA compli-
ance procedures are "subject to creative interpretation").
141. Id. at 33 (noting agency's interpretations of its own regulations cannot
be wholly inconsistent with provisions of regulations at issue).
142. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 32 (describing applicability of DOT order).
143. Id. at 32 (discussing extraordinary circumstances mandating EA or EIS
preparation as listed in Coast Guard procedures and additional DOT order).
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normally excluded action is likely to involve one of four specific
extraordinary circumstances.144
In Buzzards Bay, the Coast Guard argued that even though it
explicitly used its supplemental procedures to guide its promulga-
tion of the 2007 Rule and ensure compliance with NEPA, the preex-
isting compliance procedures listed in COMDTINST M16475.ID
were subject to creative interpretation.14 5 Additionally, because re-
assignment moved the Coast Guard from the DOT to the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security in 2003, it had the authority to ignore
the DOT order because the order was no longer relevant to their
supplemental procedures. 4 6 The First Circuit rejected these argu-
ments and held that while agencies have the power to interpret
their own regulations, they cannot use this power to read a regula-
tory provision in a way "utterly contrary to its plain language." 4 7
The court reasoned the Coast Guard attempted to disregard
the plainly stated provisions of its own established procedural re-
quirements, and such agency interpretations do not warrant judi-
cial deference.148 Further, the court noted the Coast Guard never:
informed the public that NEPA procedures changed after its reas-
signment to the DHS, explained the DOT order would no longer
be included in COMDTINST M16475.ID, or announced its depar-
ture from the extraordinary circumstances analysis.' 4 9 Because the
Coast Guard incorporated the DOT order in COMDTINST
144. DEP'T OF TRANsP., ORDER DOT 5610.1C, 23, PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDER-
ING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS (1979), available at https://www.transportationre-
search.gov/dot/fhwa/ReNepa/Lists/aReferences/Attachments/246/5610.1c.pdf
(listing circumstances when agency actions may not require EIS or EA).
145. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 32-33 (summarizing Coast Guard's argument
concerning interpretation of extraordinary circumstances listed in supplemental
procedures). Exemplifying the Coast Guard's attempt to interpret their supple-
mental procedures is a provision making an extraordinary circumstance applicable
when an agency action "is likely to be highly controversial in terms of scientific
validity or public opinion." Id. at 33, n.4. The Coast Guard sought to interpret this
provision as applicable when there is a "scientific controversy," which completely
disregards the "public opinion" language in the same provision. Id.
146. Id. at 32-33 (noting reassignment of Coast Guard from DOT to DHS in
relation to creative interpretation argument).
147. Id. at 33 (explaining First Circuit's decision to not allow Coast Guard to
interpret its supplemental procedure regarding extraordinary circumstances so
broadly).
148. Id. at 33 (discussing Coast Guard's interpretation of COMDTINST
M16475.1D). The court held the Coast Guard's interpretation of COMDTINST
M16475.ID "defies logic and exceeds the bounds of reasonable agency interpreta-
tions entitled to deference." Id.
149. Id. at 33 (describing Coast Guard's failure to provide public with new
information regarding its supplemental procedures). The court noted agencies
must present proposals to the public regarding any change in their rulemaking
process so the public will have a fair opportunity to express their views. Id. Here,
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M16475.ID, the extraordinary circumstances listed in both docu-
ments were applicable.15 0 The First Circuit concluded the issue of
NEPA compliance in Buzzards Bay must be based on the express
content of COMDTINST M16475.ID and the DOT order.'5 1 The
court thereby rejected the Coast Guard's stretched interpretation
of its own procedures. 152
B. Caught in the Act: The Coast Guard Shirks Its Duty and
Violates NEPA
Once the First Circuit decided to rely on COMDTINST
M16475.ID to determine whether the Coast Guard complied with
NEPA, the court then addressed whether the Coast Guard acted
arbitrarily by relying on a CE to avoid conducting any considerable
environmental analysis.1 53 COMDTINST M16475.ID included a
standard environmental checklist providing factors the Coast Guard
must consider when determining whether an extraordinary circum-
stance existed, which thus prevented the Coast Guard from relying
on a CE.'54 The completed checklist contained negative responses
to whether the proposed action is "likely to [have] a significant ef-
fect on public health or safety," whether the proposed action has
the potential "to be highly controversial in terms of scientific valid-
ity or public opinion," and whether the proposed action would po-
tentially violate state environmental law.' 55
the Coast Guard never gave any notice that their supplemental procedures regard-
ing how they handle the NEPA process had changed at all. Id.
150. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 32 (explaining DOT order continues to gov-
ern Coast Guard actions despite reassignment of Goad Guard from DOT to DHS).
The Coast Guard listed the extraordinary circumstances to include: agency actions
affecting health and public safety; those touching upon a site near a unique char-
acteristic of the geographic area; those likely to be highly controversial in terms of
scientific validity or public opinion; and those creating a potential or threatened
violation of state law. Id. at 35.
151. Id. at 33-34 (discussing Coast Guard's interpretation of what constitutes
extraordinary circumstance relating to NEPA compliance). The First Circuit held
that because they were dealing with the public, the Coast Guard is "bound by its
express reliance on the document that includes the incorporated DOT order and
makes no reference to the supposed DHS policy." Id. at 33.
152. Id. at 34 (holding argument of creative interpretation rendered useless
because Coast Guard failed to provide any sort of notice that procedures
changed).
153. See id. at 34-35 (addressing potential NEPA violation issue).
154. Id. at 34 (explaining how Coast Guard utilized supplemental procedures
to ensure compliance with NEPA).
155. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describ-
ing content of COMDTINST M16475.ID relating to extraordinary circumstance
analysis).
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The Coast Guard argued that because Massachusetts never ob-
jected to the proposed 2007 Rule during the notice-and-comment
period, it could rely on a CE exempting it from preparing an EA or
EIS.156 The First Circuit, however, disagreed and asserted that dur-
ing the rulemaking process, "ferocious and widespread opposition"
to the Coast Guard existed regarding the agency's approach to oil
vessel regulation in Buzzards Bay.157 The Coast Guard recognized
this opposition but wrote it off as "mere[ly] political."15 8 In analyz-
ing the Coast Guard's construal of the negative public sentiment
surrounding the 2007 Rule, the court focused on the extraordinary
circumstances exception for proposed actions that are "likely to be
highly controversial in terms . .. public opinion."15 9 The court held
the Coast Guard's decision to disregard the apparent controversy
surrounding oil vessel regulation in Buzzards Bay and failure to
conduct further environmental analysis was arbitrary and capri-
cious. 1xe The Coast Guard's reliance on a CE, therefore, was
inappropriate.161
156. See id. (summarizing Coast Guard's argument that it was exempt from
preparing environmental analysis in their promulgation of 2007 Rule); see also 5
U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (mandating notice and comment requirements of agency
rulemaking process under APA); La Casa Del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d
1175, 1177 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing notice and comment provision under § 553
of APA). The Coast Guard relied heavily upon Department of Transportation v. Public
Citizen, a 2004 Supreme Court decision holding that when a party challenges an
agency's compliance with NEPA it must structure its participation to effectively
alert the agency of its disagreement. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 34. The First Circuit
countered, however, and held the agency bears the responsibility to ensure its ac-
tions comply with NEPA. Id. The APA requires an agency publish proposed sub-
stantive regulations and provide for a period of public consideration and
comment. Sullivan, 965 F.2d at 1177.
157. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 36 (asserting public opposition to 2007 Rule
was obvious).
158. Id. (discussing Coast Guard's classification of public comments as politi-
cal). The First Circuit responded that citizens justifiably rely on political leaders to
represent their concerns, and the controversy at issue raised potentially serious
environmental issues. Id. Thus, it was the exact type of controversy the Coast
Guard guidelines directed decision makers to consider. Id.
159. Id. at 35 (emphasizing proposed federal regulations were highly contro-
versial amongst public). While other extraordinary circumstance exceptions may
have applied, an extreme controversy clearly existed so it was unnecessary to ad-
dress the other exceptions. Id.
160. See id. at 35 (discussing holding regarding Coast Guard's interpretation
of extraordinary circumstances exception and reliance on CE for proposed 2007
Rule). The court reviewed the applicability of the extraordinary circumstances ex-
ception using the Coast Guard's guidelines. Id. COMDTINST M16475.ID in-
structed decision makers "not to interpret the word 'environmental' too narrowly"
so they would not miss a controversial issue that should be dealt with through
NEPA procedures. Id.
161. Id. at 36 (holding Coast Guard's reliance on CE was erroneous because
extraordinary circumstances exception was applicable to 2007 Rule). Given that
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The Coast Guard was fully aware of the serious disagreement
regarding the displacement of state protections afforded by
MOSPA by the federal 2007 Rule. 162 The Coast Guard also knew
the environmental harm would likely continue if its proposed fed-
eral standards became effective.163 The court additionally recog-
nized the Coast Guard was involved in litigation relating to another
matter concerning the environmental effects on Buzzards Bay at
the time of the proposed 2007 Rule. 164 According to the court, this
should have alerted the Coast Guard of the likelihood of serious
disagreement over its latest oil vessel regulations. 165 The First Cir-
cuit concluded the Coast Guard's dismissal of reasonable environ-
mental concerns did not fulfill the NEPA procedural obligations;
therefore, the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 1 6 6
C. What Makes an Error Harmless?
The First Circuit concluded its discussion by addressing the
Coast Guard's final argument that its failure to prepare an EA or
EIS constituted harmless error.167 The Coast Guard contended it
previously conducted studies that were functionally equivalent to an
EIS or EA during the rulemaking process; thus, its failure to pro-
duce an environmental analysis of the Buzzards Bay vessel regula-
tion under NEPA procedures was harmless. 168 The First Circuit
the 2007 Rule was highly controversial and probably created a threat to existing
state law, the Coast Guard was obligated at the very least to determine whether
further environmental analysis was required. Id.
162. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 36 (discussing Coast Guard's knowledge of
widespread public opinion that protections beyond those afforded in 2007 rule
were necessary to prevent environmental harm to Buzzards Bay).
163. Id. (noting many believed proposed rule threatened to decrease protec-
tion against oil spills in Buzzards Bay). "In the view of many, the proposed rule
threatened to decrease materially the level of protection against oil spills in Buz-
zards Bay." Id.
164. Id. (noting Coast Guard's involvement in prior controversial matter re-
garding environmental regulation of Buzzards Bay).
165. Id. (asserting existence of previous Buzzards Bay conflicts should have
alerted Coast Guard of serious disagreement about displacing state law).
166. See id. (asserting Coast Guard's failure to address any meaningful envi-
ronmental concern was arbitrary and capricious).
167. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 37 (addressing harmless error argument).
168. Id. (discussing Coast Guard's contention that EA or EIS would have pro-
duced same results as reached in previously conducted environmental analyses);
see also Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 61 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding
failure to produce formal environmental assessment was harmless because agency
previously determined environmental effect of action would be de minimis). The
Coast Guard relied heavily on a First Circuit decision to support its conclusion that
it was extraneous to prepare an additional EA or EIS because it previously deter-
mined the environmental impact of the 2007 Rule would be de minimis. Buzzards
Bay, 644 F.3d at 37.
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recognized that in certain circumstances, it might be pointless to
require an agency to prepare an EA or EIS when the agency already
made a "reasoned finding that the environmental effects are de
minimis."1 69 The court explained, however, that these circum-
stances did not exist in Buzzards Bay.170 Here, the Coast Guard
mentioned two prior local studies when promulgating the 2007
Rule, but it did not confirm the continued environmental relevance
of those studies.171
The Coast Guard suggested the public comments on the envi-
ronmental effects of the 2007 Rule constituted a sufficient analysis
of the potential impact of the federal regulations at issue. 172 The
First Circuit rejected this argument and held the public comments
may have brought the environmental concerns to the Coast Guard's
attention, but they did not "bridge the gap between agency aware-
ness of potentially detrimental environmental effects and agency
analysis of those effects."173 NEPA obligates agencies to take a
"hard look" at the potential environmental effects of a proposed
action, and reliance on public comments submitted without notice
of meaningful environmental analysis fails to fulfill this
requirement.174
The court found the Coast Guard did not perform any envi-
ronmental analysis in establishing its oil spill regulations for vessel
transport in Buzzards Bay, and such a mistake did not constitute a
169. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 37 (noting First Circuit's previous decision
concluding EAs or EISs may not be required in all circumstances); see also Save Our
Heritage, 269 F.3d at 61-62 (holding agency's failure to complete formal assessment
under NEPA is harmless error in certain instances). As long as significant environ-
mental effects have previously been adequately taken into account, there is no
need to require a formal EA or EIS. Id.
170. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 38 (noting Coast Guard did not perform any
environmental analyses, thereby distinguishing Buzzards Bay from Save Our
Heritage).
171. Id. at 37-38 (discussing Coast Guard reliance on two previous studies to
support the illogicalness EA or EIS). The Coast Guard cited a 1996 regional risk
assessment expressing recommendations for regulated navigation areas, a 2003
safety assessment recognizing one way to lessen the risk of oil spills in Buzzards Bay
was to establish requirements for escort tugs, and a 1999 regulatory assessment
describing the potential impact of oil spills in the Puget Sound. Id.
172. Id. at 38 (addressing Coast Guard's suggestion that public comments suf-
ficiently compensate for missing EA or EIS).
173. Id. (discussing significance of preparing environmental analysis required
by NEPA).
174. See id. at 31 (discussing role ofjudicial review in NEPA compliance analy-
sis). Courts must make sure agencies take a "hard look" at the environmental con-
sequences of any given action, and the First Circuit concluded that relying on
public comments without producing any sort of substantial environmental analysis
did not constitute a "hard look." Id. at 38.
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harmless error. 75 Thus, the Coast Guard failed to satisfy the proce-
dural obligations of NEPA in establishing oil spill prevention provi-
sions for vessel transport in Buzzards Bay. 176 Declining to address
the overarching preemption issue or the applicability of additional
extraordinary circumstance exceptions, the court remanded Buz-
zards Bay to the Coast Guard to adequately perform relevant NEPA
obligations.177
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Buzzards Bay decision demonstrates a significant turning
point in the development of oil spill regulation by recognizing state
interests in an area of the law that has long been controlled by fed-
eral directives.' 78 In Buzzards Bay, the First Circuit upset years of
litigation focused on federal preemption of Massachusetts oil spill
laws and utilized a loophole in the Coast Guard's procedures to
sidestep the issue of preemption altogether. 79 By reinstating Mas-
sachusetts' laws mandating strict standards for oil-transporting ves-
sels in Buzzards Bay, the court acknowledged the widespread
175. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 38 (noting procedural shortcomings of Coast
Guard's promulgation of 2007 Rule).
176. Id. at 39 (holding Coast Guard's failure to prepare environmental analy-
sis of proposed regulations was not harmless and violated NEPA).
177. Id. (discussing common remedies for further proceedings when error is
held to be not harmless). "Where, as here, an agency has failed to satisfy its obliga-
tions under the NEPA and its error is not demonstrably harmless, the appropriate
remedy is a remand to the agency for performance of those obligations." Id. (cita-
tion omitted).
178. See id. at 28-29 (vacating injunction against enforcement of state oil spill
prevention provisions); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 117 (2000)
(asserting political responsibility for oil tanker transit belongs to Congress and
Coast Guard to confront adoption of governing regulations to ensure adequate
uniformity). The MOSPA provisions at issue are those the First Circuit reinstated
to protect against oil spills by requiring a tugboat escort for all tank vessels transit-
ing Buzzards Bay. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 29. The state regulations also "de-
mand [ed] the navigation watch on all tow vessels transiting Buzzards [B]ay ...
shall consist of at least 1 licensed deck officer or tow vessel operator." Id. at 30.
179. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 28 (asserting court will not address preemp-
tion question in appeal). But cf Massachusetts II, 493 F.3d 1, 25 (1st Cir. 2007)
(remanding to district court on preemption grounds); Massachusetts III, 724 F.
Supp. 2d 170, 175 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2010) (asserting Coast Guard's errors were
harmless); Massachusetts I, 440 F. Supp. 2d 24, 48 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2006) (holding
challenged Massachusetts state provisions preempted by federal Coast Guard regu-
lations). The law of preemption "leaves the last word under Federal law regarding
the formulation of regulations to control vessel traffic, to enhance vessel safety and
to decrease environmental hazards in Buzzards Bay to the Coast Guard." Massa-
chusetts III, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
2012] 201
29
Braeuer: A Slick Situation: The First Circuit Creates a Buzz and Turns to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
202 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XXIII: p. 173
environmental concern instigated by oil spills and emphasized the
importance of establishing adequate preventative measures.180
A. No Preemption Here: How the First Circuit Dodged the Issue
When the First Circuit faced reconciling federal and Massachu-
setts oil-transporting vessel standards in Buzzards Bay, prior litiga-
tion focused primarily on the federal preemption issue.18' The
district court consistently deemed the federal Coast Guard regula-
tions as controlling when confronted with conflicting state laws,
and the promulgation of the 2007 Rule bolstered this federal au-
thority by expressly preempting certain oil vessel provisions of
MOSPA.'82 The First Circuit appeared to realize the more strin-
gent manning and tug escort standards employed by Massachusetts
could not overcome the predominating influence of federal author-
ity guiding this area of oil spill regulation.s83 The Commonwealth
also recognized this preemptive roadblock and, unwilling to surren-
180. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 36 (observing widespread environmental
concern); see also Tug of War, supra note 33 (discussing state government's assertion
that federal law does not go far enough to protect environment); Mass. Spill Efforts,
supra note 15 (discussing Massachusetts' continued dedication to enacting mea-
sures to decrease risk of oil spill in Buzzards Bay following 2003 spill). "In the view
of many, the proposed rule threatened to decrease materially the level of protec-
tion against oil spills in Buzzards Bay." Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 36.
181. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 28 (observing appeal in this case marks "lat-
est round" in battle between United States and Massachusetts over degree of pre-
ventative measures required to deter risk of future oil spills in Buzzards Bay). The
First Circuit recognized the central question at issue in Buzzards Bay involved
whether the federal regulations instituted by the Coast Guard preempted state laws
concerning the transport of oil vessels. Id.
182. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 54, at 50,0056-57 (discussing pre-
emptive effect of 2007 Rule); Massachusetts III, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 175 (holding
procedural error of Coast Guard was essentially harmless and law of preemption
gave federal Coast Guard authority to regulate vessels and mitigate environmental
hazards from oil spills in Buzzards Bay); Massachusetts I, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 48
(enjoining challenged provisions of MOSPA because they were preempted by fed-
eral regulations under Supremacy Clause). "To the extent not otherwise already
preempted, this rule is intended to, and does, preempt those provisions of
[MOSPA] regarding enhanced manning requirements for tank barges and tow ves-
sels in Buzzards Bay, and tugboat escorts for certain waters." Proposed Regula-
tions, supra note 54, at 50,0057 (citations omitted).
183. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 29 (discussing promulgation of Coast
Guard's 2007 Final Rule "changed the legal seascape" because it expressly pre-
empted MOSPA provisions); see also Locke, 529 U.S. at 117 (holding political re-
sponsibility for oil tanker regulation requires high degree of uniformity and lies
largely with Congress and Coast Guard); Brooks, supra note 5, at 262 (noting state
laws addressing oil spill regulation can expect to be challenged in light of Supreme
Court's strong favor of federal authority in Locke). For a detailed description of the
conflicting manning and escort requirements at issue, see supra notes 61-72 and
accompanying text.
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der, based its second appeal on the Coast Guard's alleged violation
of NEPA procedures. 184
The First Circuit arguably had two avenues to sustain the trend
of partiality towards federal oil-transporting vessel regulation.185
First, the court could have relied upon the Coast Guard's supple-
mental procedures and upheld the Coast Guard's interpretation of
CEs.186 The First Circuit previously relied upon such CEs to pre-
clude agencies from conducting a traditional NEPA review.1 87 Al-
ternatively, the court could have affirmed the district court's
judgment, which held that even though the Coast Guard erred in
failing to prepare an EIS or an EA before promulgating its vessel
regulations, the error was harmless. 88 The First Circuit, however,
opted to construe the NEPA standards narrowly by giving special
weight to policy considerations and using the standards to fault the
Coast Guard despite the considerable authority given to the federal
184. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 30 (discussing Massachusetts' claim that
Coast Guard violated NEPA by failing to produce any formal environmental assess-
ment); see also Massachusetts III, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 174 (discussing express preemp-
tion of MOSPA provisions). The Coast Guard's enactment of the Final Rule left
"no ambiguity regarding the intention to preempt MOSPA." Massachusetts III, 724
F.Supp. 2d at 174. Thus, Massachusetts initiated a procedural attack alleging
NEPA violations. Id.
185. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(2) (2011) (exempting proposed action from
environmental review if it comes within CE); see also Locke, 529 U.S. at 89 (observ-
ing it is chiefly Coast Guard's responsibility to determine requisite degree of regu-
lation of oil tanker transit to appropriately safeguard environment's coastal
waters); Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 61 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding
failure to prepare environmental assessment can be considered harmless, and re-
mand may be unnecessary if agency already reasonably found proposed action's
environmental effects were insignificant).
186. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 34 (discussing Coast Guard's reliance on
CEs listed in supplemental procedures to avoid preparation of environmental anal-
ysis); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 358-59
(1989) (holding agencies are entitled to deference in interpreting their own ac-
tions so long as interpretation was consistent with controlling regulations). Be-
cause Massachusetts never objected to the Coast Guard's assertion that the
proposed regulations were not highly controversial or would not potentially violate
state law, the Coast Guard believed it had no reason to know the regulations were
creating a controversy. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 34.
187. See Town of Marshfield v. FAA, 552 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding
CEs for aircraft rerouting measures employed by FAA exempted agency from pre-
paring EA or EIS). The court held the previous noise studies conducted by the
FAA to measure the impact of rerouting measures on the surrounding communi-
ties sufficiently established that no significant environmental impact would result
from the new regulations. Id.
188. See Save Our Heritage, 269 F.3d at 61-62 (internal citations omitted) (not-
ing agency error might be harmless if requirement of agency to comply with previ-
ously evaded NEPA procedures "would accomplish nothing beyond further
expense and delay").
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government in the area of oil spill regulation. 89 By utilizing mat-
ters of public concern, highlighting the potential adverse environ-
mental effects, and emphasizing the policy issues surrounding oil
spill prevention provisions, the First Circuit dodged the overarch-
ing preemption issue, found the Coast Guard in violation of NEPA,
and reinstated the more stringent state standards for oil-transport-
ing vessels.190
B. NEPA Prevails Over Forty Years Later
The First Circuit's application of NEPA in Buzzards Bay illus-
trates the substantive impact the procedural statute can have on
controversial environmental issues.' 9 ' Often subject to criticism for
its inability to contribute to actual environmental development, the
First Circuit employed NEPA to initiate action to strengthen federal
oil spill regulation and prevention measures.' 92 Courts and Con-
gress have largely placed matters of oil spill regulation and the over-
sight of oil-transporting vessels in the purview of the federal
government. 93 Courts and Congress have also recognized state in-
terests in the regulation of coastal waters, especially when state sov-
ereigns have legitimate grounds to safeguard their local resources
189. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 35-36 (declining to rely on Coast Guard's
interpretation of CEs). The First Circuit alluded to the widespread public concern
for lower federal oil tanker standards, but concluded the controversy generated by
the Coast Guard regulations was very apparent. Id. at 36. The court also empha-
sized the existence of public opposition to the 2007 Rule in holding that the Coast
Guard's failure to conduct any sort of substantial environmental analysis was not
harmless. Id. at 37. The potential impacts of the regulations were enhanced due
to the extensive levels of environmental controversy surrounding disagreement be-
tween federal and state oil spill prevention provisions. Id. at 36.
190. See id. at 39 (summarizing holding of case).
191. See id. at 39 (illustrating NEPA's impact on controversial environmental
issue-oil spill regulation); see also Dreher, supra note 4, at 7 (noting NEPA's func-
tion as "critical tool" in addressing major environmental decisions that affect lives
and communities of public at large).
192. See Dreher, supra note 4, at 11-15 (addressing arguments that NEPA is
ineffective and counter-productive, time-consuming, mismanages resources, and
generates wasteful litigation); Tripp & Alley, supra note 105, at 81 (asserting many
view NEPA to be more burdensome than valuable). But see Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d
at 38-39 (finding NEPA violation and remanding to Coast Guard for more thor-
ough environmental analysis). The First Circuit emphasized conducting an ade-
quate assessment of environmental impacts through an EA or EIS was one of
NEPA's central objectives, and the Coast Guard's shirk of this duty prevented full
disclosure of its proposed action and potential to cause environmental damage.
Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 38.
193. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (2006) (creating federal policy bestowing
authority on Coast Guard to respond to increasing danger of vessel traffic in na-
tion's waterways); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 117 (2000) (describing over-
arching power of federal government regarding oil transit throughout nation's
coastal waters).
32
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol23/iss2/1
A SLICK SITUATION
and protect against the risk of environmental harm.194 In Buzzards
Bay, NEPA enabled the First Circuit to reconcile these competing
interests by holding state laws will govern oil-transporting vessels in
Massachusetts until the Coast Guard adequately considers all envi-
ronmental effects and impacts its regulations may have.195
The heightened judicial scrutiny employed by the First Circuit
demonstrates NEPA's potential to result in environmentally prefer-
able actions through compliance with its procedural require-
ments. 196 Because the Coast Guard failed to produce an EA or EIS
assessing the potential effects of its oil-transporting vessel manning
and escort requirements, the public lacked sufficient information
regarding the potential impacts of the Coast Guard's federal regula-
tions. 197 This is one of NEPA's central purposes, and the court ap-
propriately upheld this purpose by finding that the Coast Guard
failed to comply with the requisite NEPA procedures.s98 The con-
flict in Buzzards Bay presented the very real possibility that a formal
194. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a), (c) (2006) (requiring Coast Guard to consider
views of "officials of State and local governments" and "representatives of environ-
mental groups" in arriving at national oil-transporting vessel standards); Ray v. Ad.
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164 (1978) (explaining states are not prevented from
enforcing local laws as long as no federal laws are in direct conflict).
195. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 39 (stating holding and remanding regula-
tions back to Coast Guard demanding they comply with NEPA procedural require-
ments); see also Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing
negative effects of failing to prepare environmental analyses). In reaching its hold-
ing in Buzzards Bay, the First Circuit focused entirely on the issue of NEPA compli-
ance. Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 31. When agencies make decisions without
considering environmental impacts, "the harm that NEPA intends to prevent has
been suffered." Watt, 716 F.2d at 952.
196. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008) (not-
ing NEPA stands to prevent danger that without adequate assessment of environ-
mental impacts of agency actions there may be insufficient information regarding
potential environmental harms); Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752,
756-57 (2004) (describing specific procedural steps agencies must take requisite to
NEPA obligations); Wilderness Watch & Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v.
Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing purpose of NEPA);
Tripp & Alley, supra note 105, at 86 (suggesting heightened judicial scrutiny may
help to ensure agency compliance with NEPA). But see Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351-52 (1989) (stating agency is not required to
prioritize environmental effects of proposed action as long as it conducted proper
evaluation of potential impact). The procedural requirements of NEPA are set
forth to ensure agency decisions "take environmental consequences into account."
Mainella, 375 F.3d at 1096.
197. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 38 (reasoning Coast Guard's failure to per-
form any sort of environmental analysis on proposed action deprived public of
relevant information regarding effects of federal oil spill prevention provisions).
198. See, e.g., Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352 (discussing complete and substantive
environmental assessment is key component of informed agency action under
NEPA); Dreher, supra note 4, at 3 (noting primary purpose of NEPA includes re-
quirement of comparing environmental impacts of actions with potential alterna-
tives to promote avoidance of "ill-considered" agency decisions).
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assessment of the Coast Guard's regulations would confirm the fed-
eral provisions pose a greater risk of oil spills to Massachusetts'
coastal waters than the stricter state provisions. 199 Had the Coast
Guard conducted such an assessment and presented the results to
the public as required by NEPA, the possibility of these risks would
have risen to the forefront. 200 This would have created a greater
incentive for the Coast Guard to work with the Commonwealth and
the public to develop more stringent oil-transporting vessel
requirements.20
The Buzzards Bay decision exemplifies NEPA's ability to im-
prove the quality of federal agency decisions in light of environ-
mental concerns. 202 Critics of NEPA argue NEPA procedures are
time consuming and ineffectual, push to minimize the responsibil-
ity of agencies to evaluate potential environmental impacts, and
limit public participation in the environmental assessment pro-
cess.203 Buzzards Bay refutes these criticisms, confirms that NEPA
can be effective, and encourages often narrow-minded agencies to
display sensitivity toward controversial environmental issues. 204
The First Circuit properly interpreted NEPA's procedural require-
ments and effectively pressured the Coast Guard to act with greater
consideration of environmental impacts when addressing oil spill
199. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 36 (observing Coast Guard's knowledge of
opposition to 2007 Rule and plausible fear that environmental harm may result if
protections afforded by MOSPA were replaced with proposed federal standards
governing manning and escort requirements of oil-transporting vessels).
200. See Dreher, supra note 4, at 3-4 (explaining public participation fostered
by NEPA can significantly contribute to EIS process and aid agencies in addressing
environmental issues).
201. See id. (noting allowance for public participation as part of NEPA proce-
dures often provides agencies with valuable information not otherwise obtained);
NEPA Success Stories, supra note 131, at 6 (asserting improved environmental actions
result when federal agency experts take public perspectives into account as part of
decision-making process).
202. See Dreher, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing instances where proposed fed-
eral actions posing serious environmental consequences were improved due to
NEPA procedures).
203. Id. at 11-14 (discussing widespread criticisms of NEPA). Many people
believe that despite the well-intentioned purposes of NEPA, its procedures do not
actually have a considerable effect on ultimate decisions agencies make. Id. at 11.
204. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 39 (reinstating Massachusetts' laws provid-
ing strict standards for oil-transporting vessels in Buzzards Bay and ordering Coast
Guard to correctly perform their failed environmental assessment obligations
under NEPA); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2011) (summarizing purpose of
NEPA). "NEPA's purpose is not to generate paperwork . .. but to foster excellent
action." § 1500.1(c).
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prevention measures. 205 The court's unwillingness to defer to the
Coast Guard's eschewal of the pressing environmental risk posed by
relaxed manning and escort standards for oil-transporting vessels
demonstrates the NEPA's ability to contribute to future environ-
mentally-friendly actions.206
VI. IMPACT
In light of the First Circuit's holding in Buzzards Bay, the Coast
Guard will be forced to reconsider its governance of manning and
tugboat escort requirements for Buzzards Bay.207 The First Cir-
cuit's conclusion that the Coast Guard was in violation of NEPA
procedures reflects a heightened concern toward oil spill regula-
tion and commands agencies to give environmental concerns signif-
icant consideration when undertaking agency action. 208 Buzzards
Bay calls the federal government to action by encouraging it to re-
form its approach to oil spill regulation, and represents a momen-
tous step toward cleaner coastal waters. 209
Massachusetts will now have the opportunity to work alongside
the Coast Guard as it prepares an EA or EIS to assess the potential
environmental impacts of the proposed 2007 Rule. 210 Given the
205. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 417-18 (1976) (explaining NEPA
environmental assessment requirement reflects congressional intent to assure envi-
ronmental considerations play role in federal agency actions).
206. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 38-39 (stating Coast Guard's failure to study
environmental impact was not harmless); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008) (mandating agencies comply with NEPA's environ-
mental assessment obligations to properly inform agency and public about any and
all environmental harm that may ensue); Dreher, supra note 4, at 24 (asserting
NEPA is foundation for environmental protection and informed federal decision
making only if agencies comply with its procedural framework). "The administra-
tive record, viewed as a whole, does not show that the Coast Guard ever analyzed,
or even adequately studied, the environmental impact of its proposed action."
Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 38-39.
207. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 39 (remanding case to Coast Guard and
mandating performance with procedural NEPA obligations).
208. See Wilderness Watch & Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Mainella,
375 F.3d 1085, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing NEPA requirements must be
imposed before agency decisions are made to ensure all relevant environmental
considerations were taken into account); Dreher, supra note 4, at 14 (observing
critical role of courts in ensuring NEPA requirements are "faithfully imple-
mented"); Tripp & Alley, supra note 105, at 86-87 (noting heightened judicial scru-
tiny allows for greater enforcement of NEPA obligations and public opportunities
to push for environmentally preferable alternatives).
209. See Coakley Press Release, supra note 66 (explaining Massachusetts Attor-
ney General's belief that decision in Buzzards Bay will have powerful impact on oil
spill regulation). The Buzzards Bay decision "is an important step towards prevent-
ing future oil spills in Buzzards Bay." Id.
210. Id. (discussing opportunity of Massachusetts state government to work
with Coast Guard to implement successful oil-transporting vessel regulations); see
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high levels of public opposition, concern, and debate surrounding
the extent of oil-transporting vessel regulation in Buzzards Bay, the
Coast Guard will face substantive and practical arguments that the
regulations do not sufficiently safeguard Cape Cod's coastal waters
from the risk of oil spills. 211 While NEPA does not obligate the
Coast Guard to enforce the least environmentally harmful actions,
the Coast Guard will be compelled to address and respond to an
array of environmental issues upon conducting an adequate envi-
ronmental assessment. 212 The Massachusetts Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection stated it is prepared to undertake serious
efforts to work with the Coast Guard to develop a regulatory pro-
gram for oil-transporting vessels that provides the greatest level of
protection to the waters of Buzzards Bay.2 13
Federal courts have the authority to ensure agencies comply
with NEPA, and it is the judiciary's responsibility to command ade-
quate environmental review of agency actions. 214 The First Cir-
cuit's authoritative reprimand of the Coast Guard for its clear
failure to comply with NEPA guidelines suggests the Coast Guard
will likely address environmental concerns more seriously when
making regulatory determinations.2 1 5 On a broader level, the
also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 117 (2000) (observing states' authoriza-
tion to participate in oil spill regulation); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351-52 (1989) (explaining core purpose of EIS is to allow
interested parties to evaluate severity of potential adverse environmental effects of
agencies' proposed actions). For a discussion of the details of the controversy sur-
rounding the Coast Guard's 2007 Rule, see supra notes 41-79 and accompanying
text.
211. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 28 (discussing notable controversy surround-
ing regulation of vessel traffic in Buzzards Bay due to its role as valuable natural
resource and major channel of maritime commerce). The First Circuit recognized
that "[i]n the view of many, the proposed rule threatened to decrease materially
the level of protection against oil spills in Buzzards Bay." Id. at 36.
212. See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350 (explaining other values may trump envi-
ronmental concerns so long as agency adequately identified and studied environ-
mental concerns).
213. See Coakley Press Release, supra note 66 (discussing eagerness of Massa-
chusetts to work with Coast Guard in hopes of establishing more stringent federal
standards for oil vessels navigating in Buzzards Bay). Massachusetts DEP Commis-
sioner Kenneth Kimmell stated, "[The Massachusetts DEP] looks forward to work-
ing with the Coast Guard to develop a regulatory program that ensures that single-
and double-hulled vessels traveling through Buzzards Bay do not pose an environ-
mental threat to the valuable and historic natural resources within and throughout
Buzzards Bay." Id.
214. Dreher, supra note 4, at 14-15 (asserting federal courts play "indispensa-
ble role" in interpreting NEPA and ensuring agencies comply with requisite
procedures).
215. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006) (requiring proposals for federal ac-
tions significantly affecting environment to contain detailed statements noting en-
vironmental impacts, adverse environmental effects, and any potential alternatives
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court's decision in Buzzards Bay proposes the notion that courts will
watch agency decision-making closely and holds them to higher
standards when it comes to the consideration of pressing environ-
mental issues.216
The First Circuit's use of NEPA to avoid the overarching pre-
emption question altogether indicates federal courts recognize the
significance of effective oil spill regulation.217 The First Circuit's
tactic of second-guessing the Coast Guard and departing from the
deference given to federal authorities regarding oil spill prevent-
ative measures represents the court's acknowledgement of the
threat oil spills pose to our Nation's waters. 218 Buzzards Bay tests the
predisposition of Congress and the Coast Guard to control regula-
tory maritime law and suggests that oil-transporting vessels may face
stricter national standards in coming years.219
Oil consumption in the United States is expected to increase,
and studies estimate a substantial portion of the oil will be imported
and transported via our nation's coastal waters.220 In light of the
recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, there is
no doubt oil spill regulation remains a critical environmental is-
sue.221 The First Circuit utilized NEPA to confront this issue di-
to proposed action); see also Dreher, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing environmental
assessment measures to be NEPA's "action-forcing mechanism" to reduce environ-
mental damage from federal agency actions).
216. See Tripp & Alley, supra note 105, at 86-87 (suggesting heightened judi-
cial scrutiny of agency decision-making processes will provide for more widespread
consideration of environmental consequences).
217. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 94 (2000) (discussing dangers of
oil spills); United States v. Coal. for Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 2011)
(declining to address federal preemption). "The maritime oil transport industry
presents ever-present, all too real dangers of oil spills from tanker ships, spills
which could be catastrophes for the marine environment." Locke, 529 U.S. at 94.
218. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 36 (calling attention to "not implausible fear
that environmental harm would ensue" if MOSPA provisions were preempted by
federal regulations). In reinstating MOSPA provisions that require a tugboat es-
cort for all tank vessels transiting Buzzards Bay and imposing stricter crew and
lookout requirements, the First Circuit recognized that these standards may be
more appropriate than the less stringent standards in the Coast Guard's 2007 Rule.
Id. at 30. For a discussion of the conflicting federal and state oil-transporting vessel
provisions at issue, see supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
219. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 117 (describing overarching power of federal gov-
ernment regarding oil transit throughout nation's coastal waters); Swanson, supra
note 5, at 380-81 (observing that without uniform national system of vessel regula-
tion laws, varying state laws could have adverse effect on commerce).
220. See Ramseur, supra note 5, at 25 (discussing studies supporting proposi-
tion that United States will continue to import substantial amounts of oil in com-
ing years).
221. See Mass. Spill Efforts, supra note 15 (explaining increased efforts of Mas-
sachusetts state government to establish preventative measures to control possibil-
2092012]
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rectly in Buzzards Bay, asserting that agencies and states must act
with thorough consideration when implementing oil spill regula-
tions.222 In Buzzards Bay, the court achieved NEPA's purpose by
holding the Coast Guard responsible for failing to properly evaluate
the environmental consequences of its actions. 223 The First Cir-
cuit's decision signifies that, going forward, federal and state au-
thorities alike will be encouraged and required to devote increased
levels of time and resources to establish sufficient measures to pro-
tect against the risk of oil spills in the United States. 224
Sally Braeuer*
ity of oil spills in Commonwealth's coastal waters in response to recent Deepwater
Horizon spill in Gulf of Mexico).
222. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F.3d at 28-29 (addressing conflict between federal
and state oil spill preventative measures in Massachusetts). The First Circuit de-
scribed the conflict as "a pitched battle between federal and state sovereigns over
the nature of preventative measures needed to safeguard against the risk of oil
spills." Id. at 28. The court used NEPA to guide its analysis, concluding that
proper consideration must be given to the environment in order for oil spill regu-
lations to be valid. Id. at 38-39.
223. See id. at 38 (noting Coast Guard's failure to adequately analyze environ-
mental effects of oil-transporting vessel regulations was error of function, not
merely of form); see also President Barack Obama, supra note 1 (calling federal
agencies to action). President Obama commanded agencies to "promote public
involvement and transparency" in implementing NEPA's commitment to environ-
mental quality. President Barack Obama, supra note 1.
224. See Buzzards Bay, 644 F. 3d at 39 (remanding to Coast Guard command-
ing appropriate environmental analysis of oil-transporting vessel regulations);
Ramseur, supra note 5, at 25 (discussing variables and issues to be considered in
future of oil spill regulation).
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Villanova University School of Law; B.S., 2008, Elon
University.
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